摘要
在线性需求函数条件下 ,用博弈论的方法对两实力相当寡头和 1领导厂商 1追随厂商市场情形二度价格歧视的方法进行分析 ,并对两情形价格歧视的特点作了比较 .研究结果表明 ,两实力相当寡头进行二度价格歧视 ,获取的消费者剩余更多 ,对消费者更为不利 .
Under the condition of linear demand function, we analyzed the method of second degree price discrimination and compared it's characteristics in the case of two oligarchic enterprises that have equal power and a leading and a following one by using the method of game theory. The conclusions show that consumer's surplus will be gained more on the grounds of second degree price discrimination being enforced by two oligarchic enterprises that have equal power. For consumers, that is more harmful.
出处
《曲靖师范学院学报》
2003年第6期25-28,共4页
Journal of Qujing Normal University
关键词
线性需求
寡头厂商
二度价格歧视
博弈论
Linear demand
oligarchic enterprises
second degree price discrimination
game theory
