摘要
威胁到全球性战略稳定的美国国家导弹防御计划 (NMD)大概难免实施 ,眼下的技术障碍、欧洲盟国的不满以及俄罗斯和中国的反对不足以经久阻滞之。中国应对NMD采取怎样的基本对策 ?针锋相对的对称性战略———大大增加中国远程核导弹的数量和加速确立自己牢固的核报复能力———虽然看来必要和可行 ,但势必促成或加剧中美两国间在核武器领域和总的政治领域的“安全两难”形势 ,带来中美紧张、对立甚或冲突的中长期危险动因 ,从而大不利于中国的安全和发展。另一种可以 ,也应选择的基本对策 ,是在破除核武器神话、明了核大国彼此间使用核武器 (特别是战略核武器 )已极难想象的前提下 ,坚持不首先使用核武器的承诺 ,只需拥有对外围“核小国”或潜在核国家的有保障的潜在核威慑 /核报复能力 ,任凭美国去搞NMD。中国应当据此不让自己在中美政策—军事关系领域陷入安全两难恶性循环 ,不以关于对付最坏情况的考虑成为国家大战略思维和政策制订的核心或主要出发点。
NMD program which threatens global strategic stability might be formally put into practice over technological obstacles and the oppositions from U.S.European allies, Russian, and China. The symmetrical strategy of tit-for-tat,i.e.increasing greatly the number of China's ICBM and accelerating construction of her invulnerable second strike capability, though appears inevitable and feasible, will help to bring about or aggravate security dilemma in nuclear and general political fields, resulting in mid-and long-term dangerous dynamics for tension, confrontation, or even conflict between China and the United States, thereby damaging China's security and national development. An alternative, starting from breaking away with the myth on nuclear weapons and recognizing the unimaginability in contemporary world of using nuclear weapons(especialy strategic ones)between the great powers, is to insist on the non-first use commitment, to limit future nuclear force requirements largely to the potential and assured deterrence/retaliation capabilities against peripheral“small”nuclear power(s) or potential ones, despite the building up of NMD by the United States. China should not let herself entrapped into the vicious circle of security dilemma in the Chinese-becoming the primary starting point or central component of her state grand strategy thinking and policy formulation.
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2000年第3期12-16,共5页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
