摘要
在超级博弈中,通过对Bertrand模型中合谋与竞争策略的分析,给出了两寡头厂商价格竞争的动态模型以及寡头厂商合谋的条件,最后给出了较常见的厂商一阶段博弈情况下价格有效调整幅度的范围.
The paper gives out the dynamic model and coordination condition by analyzing the coordination and competition strategies in Bertrand game, and Nash equilibrium is a result of infinity repeated game, it would be invalid to price rise or fall in Nash equilibrium. Finally the text gives out a familiar price-adjusting area in one phase game.;
出处
《中原工学院学报》
CAS
2005年第1期33-36,共4页
Journal of Zhongyuan University of Technology
