摘要
本文运用违约保证金条款改进了代理人事前报酬契约;在契约有限执行的假设下,扩展了代理人的逆向选择模型,并运用扩展逆向选择模型分析了改进后的最优报酬契约。文章指出,改进后的最优报酬契约严格优于委托人为防范代理人违约而被迫采用的非负参与性约束条件下的最优报酬契约。
We use a clause of security deposit against the agent breaking the contract and improve the antecedent contracting of optimal reward. On the assumption of limited enforcement, we develop the model of adverse selection. We use the expanded model and analyze the improved contract. In our paper, we point out that the improved contract is stricter than the unimproved one.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2005年第1期123-127,122,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
信息经济学
最优契约
有限执行
改进
information economics
the optimal contract
limited enforcement
improve
