摘要
运用经济学原理,对职业联赛中裁判"黑哨"行为进行了分析和探讨,指出:"黑哨"是球队"寻租"与裁判的"政治创租"与"政治抽租"的结果;当裁判"黑哨"行为的MR=MC时,其实现利润最大化;裁判"黑哨"行为是代理人道德风险的一种表现,当MRm=MCm时,裁判实现道德风险净收益达到最大化;不同风险偏好类型的裁判有着不同的"黑哨"行为选择。为防范裁判"黑哨"行为,建议:推进裁判职业化;加大监督和查处力度;提高裁判执法津贴;促进竞争,末位淘汰;完善财务监督机制,建立、健全有效的激励约束机制等。
Applying the microeconomic theory, the author analyzes and discusses some problems about the referees' behavior of 'black whistles', and draws some conclusions that 'black whistles' mainly results from the rank-seeking of the sport clubs and the political money creation and extraction of the referees'; when MR is equal to MC, the referee who blows 'black whistles' realizes his maximum profit; blowing 'black whistles' is a kind of moral-hazard to the agent, and when MRm is equal to MCm, the referee realizes his maximum profit for blowing 'black whistles'; the decisions on blowing 'black whistles' or not have different kinds of preferences for risk. In order to prevent referees from blowing 'black whistles', the author suggests that we should practise the policy of professional referees, enhance supervision to referees, increase legal rewards to referees, introduce competitive systems and promote competitiveness and amplify the account supervising system, and make and perfect effective incentive-constraint system, and so on.
出处
《北京体育大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期155-157,共3页
Journal of Beijing Sport University
