摘要
尽管美国的对外政策从根本上取决于美国的国家利益要求,但总统和国会一直为争夺主导权进行着斗争。本文认为,出现这一现象是美国宪法在外交权方面界定的模糊性以及由此而导致的对各自权力份额解释的利己性所引起的。作者认为,这种模棱两可性一方面使宪法适应了各种新的政治压力,另一方面使得人们在相互竞争的原则下达成妥协。这反过来又有利于美国国家利益的实现。
Though the foreign policy of the United States basically depends on its national interest, the U. S. president and Congress always fight for dominance in foreign policy making. This article holds that the phenomenon is the result of the U. S. Constitution's vague definition of diplomatic rights for its president and the Congress combined with the selfish explanations of two parties concerned. The present paper thinks that the vagueness enables the Constitution to meet various new political pressures on the one hand, and on the other hand enables people to come to compromise in mutual competition. Also this helps the realization of American national benefit.
出处
《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期143-147,共5页
Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
美国
外交主导权
总统
国会
the United States
dominance in foreign policy making
the president
the Congress
