摘要
国有企业绩效差与经理、员工的监督激励不对称有关。对博弈论中“智猪博弈”模型进行了分析改进,并结合产权学派的探讨,将大猪、小猪与国企经理、员工相对照,从而得出建立员工和经理的双向监督激励机制才是国企增效根本出路的结论。
The bad performance of state-owned enterprise relate to the imbadance of monitor-incentive between managers and employees. This paper analyses and improves the “Pigs' Payoffs” model from the theory of games, combining the study of the property right school, compare the big pig and the piggy to the manager and the employee of the state-owned enterprise, and then draws the conclusion that build up the bidirectional monitoring-incentive Mechanism between employee and manager is just the ultimate way to increase the achievement of performance of the state-owned enterprise.
出处
《长安大学学报（社会科学版）》
2005年第1期51-54,共4页
Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
博弈论
智猪博弈
契约
激励机制
the theory of games
pigs' payoffs
the contract
incentive mechanism
