新兴市场分散投资者投资“金字塔结构”公司的激励被引量：23

The Dispersed Investors' Incentive to Invest Pyramidal Structural Corporations in Emerging Markets

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摘要隧道行为(及其反向的支撑行为)虽然合理地解释了新兴市场最终所有者以金字塔结构实现对其他公司控制的动机,但对分散投资者尽管知道存在最终所有者的盘剥但仍然投资金字塔结构公司的动机的解释并不充分。本文认为,资产回报率的差异构成分散投资者投资金字塔结构公司的主要动机。在一个简单的框架下,我们证明,投资者投资金字塔结构母公司的激励一方面来自组建或收购子公司后被最终所有者盘剥程度可能减少的“转移效应”;另一方面则来自子公司高的资产回报率所带来的正常投资回报增加的“增长效应”。对于投资金字塔结构子公司的投资者,子公司高的资产回报率所产生的“增长效应”成为其主要投资动机。 Although tunneling as well as propping addresses the problem of the ultimate owner's incentive to form pyramidal structure, it couldn't sufficiently explain the reason why dispersed investors still have incentive to invest, given that they would be appropriated by the ultimate owner. In this paper, we think that the divergence between ROAs provides the main incentive to invest for dispersed investors. In a simple framework, this paper proves that since pyramidal structure is formed, the investors' incentives to finance parent company of pyramidal structure come from not only the transferring effects of deduction of appropriation level, but also the growth effects of higher returns on assets of subsidiary firms. As for the investors who finance the subsidiary firms, the growth effects functions as the main incentive to invest. To explain the phenomena of prevalence of pyramidal structure in emerging markets completely depends on the integration of factors of both tunneling and the divergence of ROAs.

作者郑志刚

机构地区中国人民大学财政金融学院

出处《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第4期87-96,共10页 Economic Research Journal

关键词金字塔结构新兴市场投资者分散激励资产回报率增长效应子公司所有者公司控制投资回报投资动机综合考虑解释行为母公司隧道转移收购组建 Pyramidal Structure Tunneling Divergence of ROAs Transferring Effects Growth Effects

分类号 F270 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献11

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