承诺和经济政策的有效性分析被引量：10

Commitment and Analyzing the Efficiency of Economic Policies

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摘要本文主要基于基德兰德和普雷斯科特及其他人的后续研究,着重讨论了承诺对经济政策有效性的影响。本文指出,承诺通过稳定预期等有助于经济政策的有效制定和执行;但给定环境的不确定和参与人的有限理性,承诺是不完全的,这就出现了经济政策的时间不一致问题。但不完全承诺对经济本身的影响有利有弊,有效承诺应该包含一定的灵活性。保障有效承诺需要相应的制度安排,比如授权、声誉及宪政等。 Based on Kydland and Prescott and others' research, this paper has focus on discussing that commitment has influence on the efficiency of economic policies. According to these ideas, commitment may help to efficiently constitute and perform economic policies through stabilizing expectation, but commitment is incomplete under environment's uncertainty and agent's bounded rationality, the time-inconsistency of economic policies will occur. Incomplete commitment may be good or bad for economy, efficient commitment must include flexibility. Some institutions are designed for safeguarding efficient commitment, for instance, authorizing, reputation, and constitution.$$$$

作者周业安包林梅

机构地区中国人民大学经济学院中国人民大学公共管理学院

出处《教学与研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第4期26-33,共8页 Teaching and Research

基金 2004年度国家社会科学基金项目"地方政府竞争与经济增长"(项目批准号04BJL019)的阶段性成果。

关键词承诺时间一致性经济政策 commitment, time-inconsistency, economic policies

分类号 F091.3 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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参考文献6

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