摘要
针对我国生态环境治理存在政府部门代理人道德风险的社会现象,认为影响代理人个人道德风险的因素主要有诚实履约的正常收益、道德风险行为被发现的概率、贴现因子、道德风险行为的额外收益以及道德风险行为被发现后的次优收益,并且以预期收益为目标建立数学模型,分析政府部门代理人个人道德风险行为动机与影响因素之间的关系。进一步扩展模型,讨论了社会监督成本以及随机因素的影响作用。最后,提出了相关的监督、激励及协作策略。
Aim at the social phenomena about the moral hazard problem of agent in addressing the eco-environmental issues in China, we think that the factors influencing moral hazard mainly include normal income after completing contracts honestly, the probability that the behavior of moral hazard is discovered, discount factor, the additional income of the behavior of moral hazard and inferior income after the behavior of moral hazard is discovered. Then we build a mathematical model which goal is expectant income and analyze the relationship between the behavior motive of moral hazard of agent and its influencing factors. Then, we extend the model that includes the supervisory cost and the influence of random factors. Finally, we put forward correlative strategies about supervisal, inspirit and cooperation.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
北大核心
2005年第2期119-123,共5页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70121001
70103009)
山西软科学研究资助项目(031047-4)
西部能源资源开发利用战略研究资助项目(90210038)
关键词
生态治理
代理人
政府寻租
道德风险
addressing the eco-environment issues
agent
creating rent by government
moral hazard
