摘要
由于在现代企业产权制度下国有资本所有权与经营权的分离,国资委代表国家作为出资人,在编制国有资本经营预算时,与有独立经营权的企业在预算指标的确定上,因目标不同存在一定的博弈关系,这种博弈关系与其它博弈不同,它是所有权与经营权之间的博弈,是成本与效益的博弈。
Due to the separation of ownership and power of management in modern enterprises, the representative of the state-owned capital, say, the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission, have different targets with the SOEs in the issue of budget development. Different from other relations, the game relations between the two are crucial and are about cost and benefit.
出处
《经济经纬》
北大核心
2005年第3期130-132,共3页
Economic Survey
关键词
国有资本经营预算
博弈
出资人
state-owned capital budget
game
representatives of contributors
