摘要
本文针对现实生活中给予检举腐败行为以物质奖励的现象,从寻租经济学的角度,将物质奖励定义为“检举租金”;从理性经济人假设入手,利用博弈模型、边际分析和实证研究等方法,分析了“检举租金”对腐败的抑制作用,在我国转型的特殊时期,“检举租”与相关政策配合,可以促使一个以民主监督为主力的腐败预防机制的形成。
This article defines material reward in disclo si ng corruptions as “accusation rent” from rent-seeking economics perspective. On the basis of rational economic man supposition and via game model, marginal a nalysis and empirical research, we conclude that accusation rent has certain res training effect on corruptions. During Chinas transitional stage, associated w ith relative policies, accusation rent would help to form corruption prevention mechanism dominated by democratic supervision.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第3期26-30,109,共6页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
检举租金
博弈模型
腐败预防机制
Accusation rents
Benevolent rent-creation
Gam e
Corruption prevent mechanism
