摘要
我国上市公司配股融资过程中流通股股东与非流通股股东价值取向不同。在二元化市场结构体系下,按照博弈理论对配股融资的机制进行重新设计,即配股全流通的激励机制和引入分类表决权的约束机制。
Based on game theory,this paper analyses behavior strategies of the negotiable-stocks holders and nonnegotiable-stocks holders in the course of rights-issues for their different value orientation.Under the duralistic market system,it works at the restructured mechanism:the incentive free-trading mechanism of rights-issues and the restrictive classified-voting mechanism.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2005年第14期66-68,共3页
Commercial Research
基金
国家教委博士点基金资助项目
项目编号:20020287001
关键词
配股
博弈
机制再造
全流通
rights-issues
game
mechanisms restructuring
free trading stock market
