摘要
研究了不同产品结构下供应链业务外包的决策问题,首先分析了购:买商根据产品发生内部和外部质量损失而惩罚供应商的条件,建立了业务外包决策的基本模型.然后考虑了供应商的生产投资信息隐匿时会发生的逆向选择情况,把产品结构区分为相关结构和独立结构两种类型,分别建立了业务外包的委托代理模型,并运用极大值原理进行了优化求解,将不同产品结构下的决策结果进行了比较分析.最后,进行了仿真计算.
The outsourcing decision-making with different products structure in supply chain is studied. Analyzes the conditions under which the buyer has the right to punish the outsoureing supplier who is responsible for the internal and/or external quality failure found on the products sold to develop the basic outsourcing models. Then, the possible adverse selection in which the supplier concealed somewhat the real information on its business or investment is taken into account so as to divide the different products structure into two types, i.e. , the correlative and independent. The relevant principal agency models are developed for outsourcing, and the maximum principle is thus based on to get an optimal solution to them. The decision-making results in accordance to different products structure are compared with an example for simulating calculation given.
出处
《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第8期805-808,共4页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70401011).
关键词
产品结构
逆向选择
业务外包
质量惩罚
决策
products structure
adverse .selection
outsourcing
quality penalty
decision-making
