摘要
政府采购中的采购方、供应商会发生寻租行为,监管部门需要对其稽查,但有限理性条件下,三方行为策略的选择是动态演化的。在三方静态博弈收益矩阵基础上,运用演化博弈理论对采购方和监管部门二者的行为策略选择进行研究,构建其动态演化博弈模型,利用复制动态机制对模型进行求解,利用雅克比矩阵进行稳定性分析可知,影响二者行为策略选择的参数有三个:监管部门成功稽查寻租行为的概率P,稽查成本C,以及对寻租采购方及供应商的惩罚力度K,L。这些参数的大小直接决定采购方和监管部门的最终行为策略。
Rent-seeking behavior occurs between purchasers and suppliers in government procurement,so regulators need to check them.The strategy selection of the three is a dynamic evolution under the conditions of limited rationality.This paper,based on the three static game gains matrix,use the evolutionary game theory to study on the strategy choice between suppliers and regulators,using replicator dynamics mechanism to solve the model,and using the Jacobian matrix to analyze the stability and conclude that there are three parameters which influence the choice of behavior strategies,they are: the probability of successful audit,audit costs of the regulator and the punishment for purchasers and suppliers who carry out rent-seeking,the amount of these parameters directly determine the final strategy choice between the purchasers and regulators.
出处
《贵州财经学院学报》
北大核心
2010年第6期64-68,共5页
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
