摘要
首先分析了排污权交易理论在国内外的实践,结合我国流域的实际情况,提出了污染物人工调控和污染物间接不影响等几个基本假定,构建了流域跨界水污染结构描述模型.其次,建立了流域跨界水污染纠纷排污权交易宏观调控Stackelberg动态博弈模型,并用理想点法求解出博弈模型的均衡解.通过解决淮河流域跨界水污染纠纷,得出排污权交易宏观调控管理体制明显优于指令配额管理体制的结论.最后分析了影响排污权交易宏观调控管理体制实施效果的诸多因素.
Emissions trading theory and practice at home and abroad have been introduced in the paper.Several basic assumptions have been supposed according to the Chinese circumstances, including the pollutant of a river basin is highly controlled by man, etc. Model of structure description of transboundary water pollution is brought forward on the basis of above assumptions. Stackelberg dynamic game model macroscopical regulation with emissions trading to solve transboundary pollution of the river vallery of is brought forward, and numerical solution of the game model is also brought forward by means of the idealpoints method. The conclusion is that management system of macroscopical regulation with emissions trading（MSMRET） is obviously superior to management system of appointed share of pollution（MSASP） by sovling the transboundary water pollution of Huaihe River formance of MSMRET have been analyzed in the end. Basin. Some factors which shall affect the performance of MSMRET have been analyzed in the end.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第4期398-403,共6页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2005037490).
关键词
流域
跨界水污染
纠纷
排污权交易
river basin
tranboundary water pollution
dispute
emissions trading
