摘要
传统的委托代理理论是委托人和代理人在完全理性的情况下,各自可能出现的各种行为选择,以及最终双方博弈形成的纳什均衡,然而,由于我国的上市公司的股权状态并不符合传统理论中的假设条件,则委托人和代理人必然会在行为选择上发生偏移。因此,对股权分置条件下的委托代理关系中主体行为选择的偏移一一阐述。
This paper discusses the classic theory of principal and agent, and explorers the possible choices of shareholders and agent under Nash equilibrium When the shne conditions to in chinese corporations cannot accord with the established hypothesis in the classic theory, shareholders and agent will have to adjust their choices. The paper explain the adjustment of the choices of shareholders and agent.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2005年第20期44-47,共4页
Commercial Research
关键词
股权分置
博弈
委托代理理论
of separation share
game theory
theory of principal and agent
