摘要
本文通过建立一种扩展的夏皮罗-斯蒂格利茨模型,解释了“交保证金”的报酬政策在中国存在的原因。当劳动力处于买方市场时,工人在失业和就业两者之间严格偏好于就业,厂商有可能采取“交保证金”的报酬政策,那么,厂商就可以支付较低的实际工资,获得较好的监督效果,使工人努力工作。厂商以较低的工资雇佣工人,可以使劳动力市场的就业人数有所增加,但由于并不是所有工人都能够通过“交保证金”而实现就业,故这一报酬政策不能使市场出清。
By expanding on Shapiro - Stiglitz Model, we try to interpret the reason why “bonding” reward policy exists in China. If the quantity of labor supply is larger than that of labor demand, the employee will strictly prefer obtaining employment to unemployment. The employer will be likely to take the“bonding” reward policy, which can make the employer to pay lower real wages and supervise the employee to make great efforts. Relatively lower payments can increase the a mount of the employees, however, not all labors will be able to obtain employments only by bonding, so this reward policy cannot make the labor market clearup.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第10期84-91,共8页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
