摘要
基于不对称信息博弈模型,分析不对称信息下营销渠道联盟形成机理.通过计算博弈双方利益博弈过程中的期望收益和期望损失,探讨营销渠道联盟利益形成机理和补贴策略,提出了补贴收益改变博弈选择的机理.结论是当制造商不知道分销商类型时,如果营销联盟形成对制造商无利可图,则其将选择不形成营销渠道联盟,如果对其有利可图,则其愿意与分销商之间建立联盟;制造商提供充分的产品供应有助于分销商,但只有制造商在联盟中的投资比例提高,才能提高制造商提供充分产品的概率,因此,如果分销商能够适当地补偿制造商的损失可能改变制造商行为.
Based on an asymmetric information games model, this paper analyzed the marketing channel alliance formation mechanism under the condition of asymmetric information. Through calculating the expected revenue and expected loss of both sides during the process of game, it discussed the formation mechanism and subsidiary strategy of marketing channel alliance and put forward a mechanism that subsidiary would change the choice of game. The result is that if the formation of marketing alliance is not profitable to the manufacturer when he does not know the distributor＇s type, he will not choose marketing channel alliance and if it is profitable to him then he will choose. It is helpful to the distributor when the manufacturer provides sufficient product, but the probability for the manufacturer to provide sufficient product is improved only when his investment proportion is improved in the alliance. Therefore, if the distributor can compensate the manufacturer＇s loss, it will change the behavior of the manufacturer.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第10期1596-1599,共4页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70302017)
关键词
不对称信息博弈
营销渠道
联盟
形成机理
asymmetric information games
marketing channel
alliance
formation mechanism
