股东-债权人利益冲突对企业投资行为的影响——基于中国上市公司的模拟研究被引量：35

Impacts of Stockholder-bondholder Conflicts on Investment Behavior——Simulation Research Based on Listed Companies in China

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摘要国外文献表明,当经理与股东利益一致时,为追求股权价值最大化,企业很可能放弃现金流稳定且净现值为正的项目,而接受现金流波动较大但净现值为负的项目,从而产生投资不足或过度投资的问题,损害债权人及企业整体利益。运用蒙特卡罗模拟法考察我国上市公司股东-债权人利益冲突对企业投资行为的影响,模拟结果表明,在股权价值最大化的目标下,典型企业会放弃现金流固定的无风险项目,但随着项目风险的增加,企业放弃的项目越来越少,当项目风险足够大时,企业甚至会接受一些净现值为负的项目。此外,资产负债率、企业所得税率等因素都会影响股东-债权人利益冲突引起的投资行为。 Western research literatures show that managers, whose ultimate responsibility is to the stockholders,are likely to make investments that maximize stockholder wealth rather than total firm value. Managers will tend to avoid safe positive NPV projects,but to accept risky negative NPV projects,which causes underinvestment or overinvestment problems. Monte-Carlo simulations are used to analyze the impact of stockholder- bondholder conflicts on the investment decisions of listed companies in China. The results illustrate that typical firms will reject safe projects in which the wealth will transfer from stockholders to bondholders. But as project risk rising,the rejected projects will reduce and the firm will even accept some negative NPV projects. Moreover,debt ratio and income tax rate will also affect firing investment behavior arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts.

作者童盼支晓强

机构地区中国人民大学商学院

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第5期65-74,共10页 Journal of Management Science

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272003)

关键词股东-债权人利益冲突投资不足过度投资蒙特卡罗模拟 Stockholder-bondholder conflicts Underinvestment Overinvestment Monte-Carlo simulations

分类号 F276 [经济管理—企业管理]

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