摘要
三大“金融安全网”之一的存款保险,自创立以来,一直受信息不对称问题的困扰,道德风险与逆向选择使得该制度的作用在各国受到了广泛质疑。目前,我国正欲推出存款保险制度,为了该制度的顺利施行,克服其体制性缺陷所带来的弊端,本文结合信息经济学和保险学的相关知识分析了道德风险与逆向选择是如何构成存款保险的制度性缺陷。
As one of three “finance safe net”, the Deposit Insurance System has always being disturbed by asymmetric information since it was established. Furthermore, the Deposit Insurance System is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard and adverse selection. Today, the Deposit Insurance System will be brought into action in China. In order to reduce its disadvantages and enforce its action successfully, this paper deeply illustrates how moral hazard and adverse selection become the institutional deficiency of the Deposit Insurance System from the standpoint of the economics of information and insurance.
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
2005年第5期41-43,共3页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
道德风险
逆向选择
存款保险
问题
moral hazard
adverse selection
deposit insurance system
problem
