摘要
应用最优脉冲控制理论将企业技术创新的实物期权和企业间的竞争影响纳入到一个统一的框架中,研究了不对称企业的战略互补产品的创新投资问题.将不对称企业的技术创新投资决策视为脉冲控制并求得在各种状态下企业的投资收益;详细地分析了2个企业投资博弈中存在的2种均衡,即序列均衡和同时均衡,研究结果表明,均衡结果依赖于2个企业成本的不对称程度和创新产品的战略互补程度,进一步讨论了在序列均衡状态下跟随企业投资的期望执行时间;最后,应用数值案例定量地给出了企业的投资临界值和相应的均衡结果,从而验证了理论分析结果.
Real options of investment in technology innovation and effect of competition between finns are combining into a unique framework using optimal impulse control theory. Investment decision making in technology innovation of cost asymmetric finns in presence of strategic complementary is studied. Firstly, investment decision in technology innovation of asymmetric finns are viewed as impulse controls. Value function under many conditions are derived. Then two equilibriums, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium, are analyzed in detail. The results demonstrate that the equilibriums depend on asymmetry among finns and strategic complementary. Expectant investment time of follower finn under sequential equilibrium is discussed. Finally, numerical techniques are employed to derive investment thresholds and equilibrium result. The findings are consistent with the theoretic results.
出处
《东南大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第6期958-962,共5页
Journal of Southeast University：Natural Science Edition
基金
高等学校博士学科点基金资助项目(20030286008)
关键词
最优脉冲控制
战略互补
不对称企业
实物期权
optimal impulse control
strategic complimentary
asymmetric enterprises
real options
