摘要
研究了在Cournot市场竞争条件下,生产企业的横向并购对于上游供应商和整条供应链利润的影响,以及供应链权力配置在并购中的效应.算例表明,横向并购后的供应链及其各成员企业的绩效,除了受到参与并购的企业数量影响,还受到供应链权力配置的影响.供应商的垄断力越大,并购后获得的利润越大.生产企业在供应链的地位随并购企业数量增加而增加,抵消了由于供应商垄断力增加的影响.
The influences of horizontal merger on upper suppliers and the profit of the whole supply chain were investigated, and the effects of the power structure within a supply chain during horizontal merger were analyzed. It was assumed that the merger was under Cournot competition. An example shows that the profit of a supply chain, as well as the members in the supply chain, depends on both the number of manufacturers taking part in the merger and the power structure of the supply chain. The larger the powers of suppliers are, the more profit they can obtain after merger. The status of manufacturers improves with an increase in the number of enterprises taking part in the merger, which counteracts the effect of increase in the power of supplies.
出处
《西南交通大学学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第1期122-126,共5页
Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372056)
关键词
横向并购
供应链
效应
绩效
供应商
生产企业
horizontal merger
supply chain
effects
profit
supplier
manufacturer
