网络外部性与企业纵向兼并分析被引量：11

Network Externality and the Analysis of Enterprise Vertical Merger

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摘要运用垂直产品差异化模型,研究了产品具有网络外部性特征时,企业是否有实行纵向兼并的动机。研究表明,在具有网络外部性特征的产业市场中,企业更有动机去实施纵向兼并一体化战略,并指出在具有网络外部性特征的产品市场中,无论对厂商和消费者,纵向兼并后的市场结构的均衡效率都要优于非一体化的寡头市场结构的均衡效率。 Through the model of product vertical differentiation , the paper analyzes whether there is the motive of enterprise vertical integration and unintegration in the product with network externality. The results show the enterprises have more motive to carry out the strategy of vertical merger and integration in the product market with network externality. And it shows for enterprise or consumer, that the equilibrium in the market structure of vertical integration is superior to one in the market structure of unintegrated monopolists.

作者程贵孙陈宏民孙武军

机构地区上海交通大学安泰管理学院

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第6期131-135,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

基金中国博士后基金资助项目(2004036100)

关键词网络外部性质量纵向兼并 network externality quality vertical merger

分类号 F224 [经济管理—国民经济] C931 [经济管理—管理学]

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参考文献14

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二级参考文献21

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