摘要
通过对技术委托开发委托代理关系特点的分析,在国内外学者研究成果的基础上通过激励机制设计了三阶段对策模型,建立了一个同时可以分析隐藏行动、隐藏信息道德风险的总体框架,在此基础上,运用米尔利斯—霍姆斯特姆模型方法对每种可能情况下的最优合约特征进行了分析。
Under the framework of three-stage reference model concerning mechanism design, the paper analyzes the moral hazard of R＆D units in the course of commissioned technological development. Based on the research findings of both domestic and international scholars, and the analysis on the characters of the commissioned technology development, it comes up with some new assumptions and sets up a framework, which can analyze the moral hazard of hidden behavior and hidden information simultaneously. Based on the framework, it adopts Mirrlees-Holmstrom Approach to analyze the features of optical contract under each possible circumstance.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第11期85-90,共6页
Systems Engineering
关键词
机制设计
技术委托开发
道德风险
Incentive Mechanism Design
Commissioned Technological Development
Moral Hazard
