摘要
从代理理论的现代企业理论出发,提出广泛存在的独立董事制度之弱化治理效应的一种理论假说,即独立董事的某种程度的经理人性质及其与股东之间的客观代理关系与代理问题,没有被理论研究者和市场参与各方所认知,这是设计、引入独立董事制度却未能发挥治理作用的本源之所在。而且,该假说也得到来自中国上市公司独立董事报酬数据,及其与公司业绩相关性等经验证据关系的验证,同时利用经验证据对提出的理论假说进行验证,得出结论:独立董事具有某种意义上的经理人性质,在公司治理中存在着不可忽视的代理关系和代理问题;独立董事报酬与公司业绩的正相关性正是对独立董事的代理关系及其不被认识的经验验证。因此,在选聘激励和监督独立董事过程中,过于倚重独立性应值得反思和纠正。
From the modern enterprise theory based on the agent theory, this thesis brings up a theoretical hypothesis to interpret the phenomenon of the common poor governance effect of the independent director institution. Namely, the executive nature of independent director which is neglected to some extent, and its objective agent relationship with stakeholder that haven＇t been recognized by theory researchers and market participants form the cardinal cause of no governance effect when the independent director institution is designed and established. The evidence for the independent director＇s compensation and its relevance with corporate performance of listed companies also positively testify this hypothesis. Theoretical and political suggestions are thus put forward to improve and perfect the governance effect of the independent director institution.
出处
《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2006年第1期37-42,共6页
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70172010)
关键词
独立董事制度
公司治理
现代企业理论
Independent director institution
corporation govemarice
modem enterprise theory
