摘要
上市公司中的大股东控制、恶性融资与配股盈余操纵是各界高度关注且密切关联的重大问题。上市公司在配股时既可能正向操纵盈余,也可能负向操纵盈余。本文以配股政策3年净资产收益率要求中最后1年为1999年的196家成功实施配股的A股上市公司1999年的年度数据为样本,就此展开研究,结果发现,控股股东的持股比例越高,对上市公司的控制能力越强,上市公司正向操纵盈余的程度越大,负向操纵盈余的程度越小;控股股份为国家股时,盈余操纵程度较小;预期从中小股东处筹集的资金规模越大,上市公司正向操纵盈余的程度越大,负向操纵盈余的程度越小;资金储备压力越大,正向操纵盈余的程度越大,负向操纵盈余的程度越小。
Control by main shareholders of listed companies, malignant financing and earnings manipulation in rights issues are three closely related subjects followed with interest by various circles. During rights issuing, listed companies may positively or negatively manipulate earnings. In our study, we have taken as samples the data of the year 1999 gathered from 196 A-share corporations that have satisfied the ROE requirements according to policies for issuing rights in successive 3 years (the latest year is 1999) and that have obtained approval of issuing rights from SEC. As a result, we have found out that the higher the proportion of share held by controlling shareholders, the greater the control over listed companies; that the more positive the manipulation of earnings, the less negative the manipulation of earnings; that if controlling shares are state-owned ones, the earnings are less manipulated; that the more expected capital financed from minority shareholders, the more positive and less negative the manipulation of earnings; and that the greater the pressure of reserve funds, the more positive and less negative the manipulation of earnings.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期129-136,共8页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"中国上市公司会计行为的异化及其监管创新研究"(批准号:70372037)的阶段性研究成果
