摘要
本文认为,进入权理论为公司治理研究提供了一个新的视角,它使得我们对公司治理的理解更贴近于管理实践,但是,进入权自身的机会性使得进入权的配置机制中充满不确定,以至于它无法像设计的那样有效塑造当事人事后的讨价还价能力。不确定来自于:①关键资源的特征。关键资源应该是一束可分割的权利集,即使是一束虚拟的权利集;②对人力资本专用性投资的计量,包括对人力资本专用性投资程度的计量和对人力资本专用性投资绩效的计量。如果不能克服进入权的机会性所引致的不确定,它很可能只是一种可用于指导公司治理实践的思维方式,而不能成为公司治理的理论基础,至少现阶段如此。
Although access has provides a brand-new view on corporate governance approach that it enables us to understand corporate governance practically,access would not shape parties＇ bargaining power efficiently as it had been expected for opportunities contained in access itself make access allocating mechanism inefficient with begetting uncertainty in. Uncertainty arising from two way： first,the property characteristics in critical resources. Critical resources should be segmentable droit collective,even virtual. Second,the process measuring agent＇s specific investment with her human capital,including the degree on specific investment and investment performance measuring. On condition that principal could not hurdle uncertainty brought by opportunities,access could probably be seemed as an idea to guide corporate governance practice instead of being taken as theoretical foundation,at least this time.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第2期91-97,共7页
China Industrial Economics
关键词
进入权
关键资源
公司治理
专用性投资
人力资本
access
critical resource
corporate governance
specific investment
human capital
