摘要
借助信息经济学理论对我国经营者激励扭曲问题进行研究，并利用上市公司的数据对激励扭曲内在机理进行实证分析。结论显示：出资者和经营者的信息不对称导致了二者的风险和收益不对称，市场中不同类型经营者之间信息不对称导致市场激励的失衡，形成了“激励过度”和“激励不足”并存，降低了公司盈利能力和市场竞争力。构建风险收益对称安排的“激励性契约”，有助干优化配置经理人资源，改善我国上市公司的整体业绩。
Analyzing problems of compensation incentive for operators in Chinese listed firms with information asymmetry theory, empirically researching the interior mechanism of incentive distortion, it＇s found that information asymmetry causes risk-taking unbalance between shareholders and operators, and that information asymmetry in the market leads to unbalance of market stimulation, so ＂excessive incentive＂ and ＂insufficient incentive ＂exist simultaneously, which depresses enterprises＇ capacity of earning and competitive power in the market. Thus, designing incentive contracts with symmetry of risk-taking and return will optimally assign operators＇ resources, and will significantly improve listed firms＇ performance in China.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第3期99-104,共6页
Reform
关键词
经营者业绩
信息不对称
风险收益分担
分组回归
operators＇ performance, information asymmetry, share in risk-taking and return, group regression
