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基于过度自信的多任务委托——代理模型扩展研究 被引量:15

Extended Research of Multi-task Principal-agent Models Based on Overconfidence
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摘要 在分析现有文献对多任务委托——代理模型拓展研究局限基础上,从行为经济学视角,假定代理人不再是完全理性的经济人,而是遭遇了过度自信心理偏见的“非理性人”,并通过一定方法把过度自信的心理偏见导入到多任务委托——代理模型基本分析框架中,然后沿用标准的委托——代理分析技术,对改变关键假设后的模型进行处理,从而修正了多任务委托——代理模型的分析框架和一些基本的结论。 From the perspective of behavioral economics, the paper premiss that the agent is not completely rational person but non-rational person suffered from the overconfidence bias on the base of the review of the principal-agent expansion's research. And the paper introduces overconfidence bias into multi-task prlncipal-agent model in virtue of some method and deal with the model that crucial assumption is changed by means of standard principal-agent analytical technology. Thus the paper amends the basic frame of multi-task principal-agent model and some basic conclusion.
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2006年第2期19-22,共4页 Systems Engineering
基金 教育部科学技术重点资助项目(104260) 湖南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(0403019)
关键词 过度自信 委托——代理 多任务 Overconfidence Princlpal-agent Multi-task
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参考文献14

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二级参考文献24

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引证文献15

二级引证文献114

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