摘要
国有企业“代理问题”的实质,是国家利益与国有企业经营者利益的关联度、国有企业经营者的动力和重构国有企业经营者激励约束机制等问题。对比分析固定收入制、年薪制和股票期权制等三种典型的薪酬激励方式,固定收入制不具有有效的激励作用;年薪制可以确保经营者的普通日常性努力经营行为,但不能保证经营者一定采取有利于企业长远利益的长期行为,更不能避免经营者的短期行为;股票期权制是激励经营者采取长期行为的有效激励方式,然而,现行的股票期权激励缺乏对企业经营者长期持股的约束。要建立内在化、动态化和长期化的激励机制,在激励方式上除了要突破收入分配限制,提高国有企业经营者的收入标准之外,更重要的是要制订更加有效的方案,给予企业经营者股票或股票期权,以股权激励的方式使其自身利益与股东利益及企业的长期发展结合起来。
The essence of the state-owned enterprise＇s agent problem lies in the relation between the national profit and the manager＇s profit of the state-owned enterprise, in the incentive of the state-owned enterprise＇s manager and in the issue to reconstruct the incentive-restrictive system of the state-owned enterprise＇s manager. We compare and analyze the effects of the following three typical salary incentive patterns, namely, fixed income pattern, annual salary pattern and stock option pattern on the manager＇s behavior. We conclude that the fixed income pattern isn＇t of effective incentive, that the annual salary pattern may guarantee the ordinary, daily behavior of the manager, but couldn＇t guarantee the manager to adopt the long- term behavior absolutely which is good for the enterprise＇s strategic profit, even prohibits the manager from short- term behavior, and that the stock option pattern is the effective incentive pattern that guarantees the manager to adopt long-term behavior, but it isn＇t restrictive for the managers to hold their stocks long. In order to create the inherent, dynamic and long incentive system, besides breaking the income distribution constrict in incentive pattern and improving the income criterion of the state- owned enterprise＇s manager, the more important thing is to make more effective plan and to give the manager stock or stock option, which makes them connect their own profit with the stockholders＇profit and the enterprise＇s long-term development.
出处
《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》
北大核心
2006年第2期60-65,共6页
Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）
关键词
国有企业
经济激励
股票期权
the state-owned enterprise
economic incentive
stock option
