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基于重复博弈的P2P网络信用管理机制的研究 被引量:16

Study of Mechanism of Trust Management to P2P Networks Based on the Repeated Game Theory
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摘要 自组织特性是P2P网络的基本特征之一,管理模式的自组织使得与之相适应的安全模型难以建立.当前基于节点全局信用度模型的分布式算法存在时间复杂度高、报文通信量大等不足,因而对其所能应用的P2P网络的规模存在限制.提出一种基于非合作重复博弈理论的信用管理模型RGTrust,在P2P网络参与节点是理性且自私的假设条件下,从理论和实验两方面说明了应用RGTrust信用模型方案的P2P网络具有良好的稳定性及整体性能的最优性,并且信用计算的时间复杂度及报文通信量远低于其他信用模型. Self-organization is a fundamental property of P2P networks. The local views of the nodes which are managed in self-organization mode make the corresponding trust model hard to establish. Current trust models based on global reputation by using the iterative method have high time complexity and excessive incurred packets, thus limiting the scalability when applied to P2P networks. A novel trust model, named RGTrust, based on repeated game theory is given in the paper. Under the assumption that individual peers are rational and selfish, the mechanism of RGTrust is described in details. P2P networks using RGTrust scheme have a good performance and stability. Furthermore, compared with other types of trust model, RGTrust yields both lower time complexity and fewer incurred packets. Simulations have also verified the conclusion.
作者 刘业 杨鹏
出处 《计算机研究与发展》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2006年第4期586-593,共8页 Journal of Computer Research and Development
基金 国家"九七三"重点基础研究发展规划基金项目(2003CB314801) 国家自然科学基金项目(60573133)
关键词 P2P网络 信用 自组织 重复博弈 P2P networks trust self-organizing repeated games
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参考文献12

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