摘要
相关性评价中牵涉到大量的被评价管理者互相评价的问题,评价结果通常和奖惩有关。相关性评价提倡在被评管理者中间保持适当的亲和性,但过度的亲和性难以避免地会产生合谋行为。本文针对这种现象建立一个一主多从模型,随后对模型加以改进,以分析公司与被评者、被评者与被评者之间的博弈关系,进而得出相应的结论。
In a system of relevant evaluation, managers have to evaluate each other. Suitable harmonization conduces. But when it is excessive, it may lead to conspiracy. In this paper, a leader-follower-model （company and two managers） is established and then improved to analyse the relationships between company and managers and between managers. Further more, some conclusion is drawn.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2006年第2期59-64,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词
相关性评价
纳什均衡
主从对笨
relevant evaluation
Nash equilibrium
leader-follower strategy
