摘要
产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派,研究结果均表明,规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率,降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题,并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验,结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应,即规制低效率。因此,规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率,而解决问题的关键是机制设计。
Studies on regulation collusion in IO are divided into Chicago School and Toulouse School. Result demonstrates that collusion between regulator and regulated firm leads to inefficiency and reduces social welfare. This paper studies collusion between local regulator and regulated firm in the background of regulation decentralization. It tests the effect of regulation with econometric method. Result demonstrates that regulation decentralization doesn＇t take positive effect,namely inefficient regulation. So collusion resulting from regulation decentralization leads to inefficient regulation and the key to solve the problem is mechanism design.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期23-28,共6页
China Industrial Economics
关键词
规制分权化
合谋
制度效率
电力行业
regulation decentralization
collusion
institutions efficiency
electricity industry
