摘要
中国证券市场股权分置改革是一个系统工程,对价谈判博弈不仅仅包含讨价还价博弈,还包括上市公司股价估值,上市公司的行业背景和成长性分析,上市公司的股权结构特点分析等,是一个非常复杂的博弈模型。本文通过分析股权分置改革对价谈判的博弈过程给出了一个在完全信息条件下对价谈判的非合作博弈模型及其纳什(Nash)均衡最优解的求解过程,并详细分析了影响对价最终结果的关键因素和得到纳什均衡最优解的泽森(Zeuthen)讨价还价过程,供股权分置改革方案的设计者和广大投资人参考。
Non-tradable stock reform is a systematic project in China securities market. The value-giving negotiation involves not only bargaining but also estimating the share price of the listed companies, analyzing the industry＇ s background and development, analyzing the characteristic of equity capital＇ s structure. It is a very complicated model. This article presents a process of cooperation game theory model in value-giving negotiation and the best solution-seeking in Nash equilibrium under a perfect information condition. Also it gives,a detailed analysis of the key factors affecting the result of value-gving and the process of Zeuthen bargaining to gain the best solution of Nash equilibrium so as to offer some references for designers of non-tradable stocks reform scheme and investors.
出处
《广东商学院学报》
2006年第2期40-43,72,共5页
Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
关键词
股权分置改革
对价谈判
非合作博弈
纳什均衡
泽森过程
non-tradable stocks reform
value-giving negotiation
non-cooperative game theory
Nash equilibrium
Zeuthen process
