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基于声誉机制的风险投资与风险企业博弈分析 被引量:6

Analyses on Risk Investment and Venture Business Gambling Based on Fame Mechanism
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摘要 在资本市场中,风险投资活动以风险投资家和风险企业的合作为基础。同时,风险投资与风险企业也存在着信息不对称,双方在相互寻找和选择的过程中进行着博弈。研究如何建立风险投资与风险企业之间的合作机制,抑制博弈过程中可能会出现的机会主义行为,将对风险投资活动起到重要的指导作用。 In the capital market, risk investment is based on the risk capitalists and the cooperation with the venture businesses. Meanwhile, there are some unbalanced information between the risk investment and venture business and gambling will occur during the process of their seeking and choice. How to set up the cooperation mechanism between risk investment and venture business and to prevent opportunism during gambling is very iraportant in risk investment.
作者 张道宏 张贺
出处 《税务与经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第3期8-10,共3页 Taxation and Economy
关键词 风险投资 风险企业 博弈 risk investment venture business gambling
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参考文献7

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二级参考文献16

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