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现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究 被引量:200

Corporate Value of Separating Cash-Flow Rights From Control:Empirical Study on Family Owned Public Firms in China
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摘要 为探究现金流权与控制权的分离对我国家族上市公司价值的作用机理以及影响程度,本文首先建立了一个基于控制权私人收益的理论模型。然后,本文以121家家族上市公司为样本,对现金流权、控制权、现金流权与控制权的分离率以及影响公司价值的诸多因素进行细致的分析。研究表明,我国家族上市公司现金流权与控制权的分离率平均为62%,并且此分离程度在东亚为最高。另外,研究发现:我国家族上市公司价值与现金流权比例显著负相关,这可能是与控股股东的“掠夺性分红”行为有关;我国家族上市公司价值与控制权比例显著负相关,与独立董事人数占董事会比例、负债规模、净资产收益率均不相关,与公司规模显著负相关;公司规模与现金流权与控制权的分离率显著负相关。 In order to find the infection mechanisms and degree of the separating cash-flow rights from control on corporate value,we present a model based on the private benefits of control.We then test this model using a sample of 121 family owned public firms in China.We find the average separation rate of cash-flow rights from control of family owned public firms in China is 62%,which is the most in East Asia.We find corporate value of family owned public firms in China is negative correlative with cash-flow rights,which due to the controlling shareholder's 'expropriating dividend behavior'.Otherwise,we find corporate value of family owned public firms in China is negative correlative with control right and corporate size,and it is irrelevant to the rate of outside director to directorate,the size of liability and ROE.Corporate valve is negative correlative with separation rate of cash-flow rights from control.
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第4期30-36,共7页 Accounting Research
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