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关系网络与雇主机会主义行为的实证研究 被引量:7

An Empirical Research on Social Networks and Opportunism of Employers
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摘要 在相同的司法体系下,为什么不同地区和不同类型企业的劳动争议数量和频率仍会有很大的差异?本文从关系网络的角度,分析作为第三方实施的社会实施机制——关系网络对经济主体行为的约束。员工拥有越多当地的社会关系网络,关系网络对雇主机会主义行为的约束力就越大。因而,一个地区外来劳动力越多,雇主的机会主义行为就越猖獗。一个地区外来雇主越多,雇主的机会主义行为也越多。本文用中国2000年31个省区的横截面数据验证了以上命题。 The volume and frequency of labor disputes differ greatly in different regions of China,and differ in different kinds of firms under the uniform legal system. From the point view of social network ,it is social network constraints the opportunities of employers. Social network constraint is a kind of third-party enforcement substituting the legal enforcement. The more social network workers have with the government officials,the fewer opportunism behaviors of firms. Therefore,the more floating migrants in a region,the more opportunistically behaviors of employers. The more foreign employers who enjoy government special protection and favor,the more breaches of labor contracts and labor laws of employers will perform. The last part gives empirical evidences of cross-section data of 31 provinces in year 2000 for the propositions above.
作者 郑筱婷 王珺
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期96-104,共9页 China Industrial Economics
关键词 关系网络 劳动契约 实施 劳动争议 social network labor contract enforcement labor disputes
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