摘要
国企改革中对国企经营者的薪酬管制并未化解代理人的道德风险，反而使经营者在职消费过多过滥；控制权之争的惟一目的就是获取控制权收益。政府在变革国企经营者报酬体系时应坚持三项基本原则：一是报酬显性化；二是报酬与业绩挂钩并加大浮动比例；三是赋予经营者以股权，但股金应由经营者个人支付。
The research indicates that compensation regulation for operators of SOEs can＇t remove moral hazard; on the contrary, it leads to more and more non-pecuniary compensation. Contending for the private benefits of control power becomes the sole motivation. The government should persist in three principles when government reform outdated and irrational executive compensation： firstly, the compensation must be visible; secondly, the compensation must connect with their performances; thirdly, government should awards shares to the executives and the executives must pay for the equity.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期75-81,共7页
Reform
关键词
薪酬管制
在职消费
控制权收益
激励体系
compensation regulation, non-pecuniary compensation, private benefits of control power, incentive system
