代理成本对审计师选择的影响——基于中国IPO公司的研究被引量：38

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摘要西方大量研究表明,代理成本对公司审计师选择行为具有显著影响,公司的代理冲突程度越高,选择大事务所进行审计的动力就越强。本文在对我国179家IPO公司研究后发现,在公司规模、财务杠杆、管理层持股比例、第一大股东持股比例这四个反映公司代理冲突的变量中,公司规模与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正向关系,管理层持股比例与是否选择大事务所审计则呈倒U形关系,没有发现财务杠杆、第一大股东持股比例与审计师选择存在显著关系的证据。因此,建立在英美条件下的代理理论对我国审计师选择行为的解释力并不充分。

作者李明辉

机构地区厦门大学会计系

出处《经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第3期73-83,共11页 Economic Science

关键词代理成本代理冲突审计质量审计师选择

分类号 F832.5 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献21

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二级参考文献11

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