摘要
基于股利政策的信号传递视觉,将股利政策作为一个可观测变量引入T irole企业家道德风险模型,探讨在股权分置情况下降低代理成本的途径。在合理假设基础上,我们证明,控股股东对经理进行监督,不仅增加公司净现值,控股股东和中小股东的效用也增加。“一股独大”公司支付现金股利,控股股东效用增加,中小股东效用不变;发放股票股利,控股股东和中小股东效用同时增加。股权制衡公司支付现金股利,控股股东和中小股东的效用都增加;发放股票股利,控股股东效用不变,中小股东效用增加。
According to agent singaling theory, this paper explores measures to reduce agent cost in equity separate market by introducing dividend policy into Tirole＇s entrepreneur moral hazard model. Basing on rational hypotheses, we show that net present value（NPV） of the corporation, stakeholders＇ benefit and small shareholders＇ benefit will be higher when the stakeholder supervises the manager. In single stakeholder corporation, paying out cash dividend can improve stakeholder＇s benefit. But small shareholders＇ benefit is still stable. Stakeholder and small shareholders can get more benefit by paying out stock dividend. In two or more stakeholders corporation, paying out cash dividend can improve stakeholders and small shareholders＇ benefit at the same time. Stakeholders＇ benefit will be still stable, and small shareholders＇ benefit will be higher when the corporation payes out stock dividend.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第5期72-75,共4页
Systems Engineering
关键词
股权分置
股利政策模型
控股股东
Equity Separate
Dividend Policy Model
Stakeholders
