摘要
网间价格歧视是电信运营企业的一个重要竞争手段,运用系统动力学分析电信运营市场的这种价格竞争,结果表明,对于市场中的主导者来说实行网间价格歧视有利可图,对于追随者出于理性只能选择不实行网间价格歧视。这种主导者实行-追随者不实行的均衡,对增加社会福利是有利的。企业的市场地位是相对的概念,因此对于某些企业来说可能会表现为一个相对强势和相对弱势同时并存的局面,这使实行或不实行网间价格歧视成为一个两难选择。
Price discrimination among networks in telecommunication markets was analyzed by using system dynamics. It is concluded that for leading telecommunication enterprises, adopting price discrimination among networks has good prospect of profits; not adopting the price discrimination is also a rational selection for following telecommunication enterprises. This balance between the leading enterprises and the followers is helpful to increasing social welfare. The market position in which an enterprise is would be relative. Relative superior and inferior in marketing competences could co exit in some telecommunication enterprises, for example China Mobile. Thus, the picture of the balance would be complex. Whether to adopt the price discrimination or not would be in dilemma.
出处
《管理学报》
2006年第4期407-411,426,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
关键词
电信市场
网间价格歧视
系统动力学
模拟与仿真
price discrimination of inter network
system dynamics
telecommunication
model and simulation
