摘要
20世纪70年代发展起来的战略性贸易政策理论强调博弈的思想,指出在不完全竞争市场和规模收益递增的基础上政府对经济的干预可以改变本国企业和外国企业在竞争中的地位从而增进本国福利,它为政府对经济的干预提供了新的思路。中国加入WTO后,在世贸框架约束下研发补贴是当前我国运用战略性贸易政策工具的现实选择。本文发展了一个三阶段研发补贴模型,并结合我国现阶段的实际情况对该模型的适用性进行了分析,在此基础上给出了相应的政策建议。
The theory of strategic trade policy that has been developed since 1970s has taken the thought of game theory into consideration. It points out that in imperfectly competitive market and increasing return of scale economy, domestic government＇ s interventions could alter the condition of domestic firm and foreign firm in international competition, therefore, enhance the domestic welfare. This provides the government with a kind of new thought into intervention. After China＇ s entry into WTO, under the framework of WTO, R＆D subsidy is the practical choice of the/government to implement the strategic trade policy. In this paper a three-stage model of game is developed and after analyzing its feasibility in China, some suggestions are given.
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第4期56-60,共5页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
