摘要
在内部治理机制亟待完善、外部审计约束乏力的情况下,集中持股、具有绝对信息优势的第一大股东(基本为非流通股)不仅有动机也有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报表,掩盖实际存在的问题,避开外部审计约束；而此时,其他大股东很有可能不选择通过内部治理机制实施对第一大股东的制衡,而是更多地求助于外部治理机制,利用自身的信息优势与外部审计者合作,降低信息不对称性,配合注册会计师审计、发现控股股东的财务粉饰和造假行为,提高外部审计约束的有效性。此外,持股比例和制衡能力的消长以及对成本和收益的权衡。使得大股东持股比例、大股东制衡度和上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见的可能性之间表现为正“U”形关系。
Facing with imperfect internal governance mechanisms and weak external auditing constraints,the controlling shareholders(holding un-trad- able shares in most cases)with significant information advantages have not only the motivation but also the ability to be involved in and to cover up more and more frequent financial dressing and even financial fraudulent in annual reports.And at the same time,other bleckholders most probably give up to depend on internal governance mechanisms to counterbalance controlling shareholders,but choose to fall back on external auditing con- straints and to cooperate with independent auditors thus decreasing information asymmetry with their information advantages,and enhance effective- hess of external auditing constraints to find financial dressing and fraudulent in annual reports and to issue modified audit opinions.Besides,we also find that the relationship between shareholding percent and counterbalance degree of blockholders,and the frequency of receiving modified au- dit opinions is the positive“U”shape because of the eat and flow of shareholding percent and the tradeoff d cost and benefit of blockholders.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第7期21-29,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
本文受到李雏安教授主持的国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001)
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(04JJD630003)
教育部哲学社会科学重大攻关项目(03JZD0018)等资助。
