大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析被引量：22

Economic Analysis of Big Shareholders′ Tunneling and Propping Their Listed Companies

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摘要在公司的所有权安排中,大股东拥有公司的控制权,有能力为获取控制权的私人利益而侵占上市公司的资源。但是,当上市公司陷入经营困境时,大股东可能通过减少自己的侵占行为而使公司具有偿债能力,甚至会用自己的资源进行支持以防止公司破产。如果上市公司的投资回报率低于大股东的预期水平,或者预期上市公司无法继续生存下去时,大股东会以公司外部股东和债权人的利益为代价而对上市公司进行掠夺。 In the listed companies,the big shareholders can tunnel resources in order to obtain control rights for their private interest because they are privileged to possess control rights in the corporation.However,they can reduce their expropriation,even use their own assets to prop the companies and prevent them from going bankrupt when the listed companies are in operation troubles.They can also expropriate the interest of other shareholders and creditors when the return on investment in their listed companies is lower than expected,or when they expect it is difficult for the listed companies to survive.

作者侯晓红

机构地区中国矿业大学管理学院

出处《中南财经政法大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期120-125,共6页 Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

关键词大股东掏空与支持产权理论资产专用性动态模型 Big Shareholder Tunneling and Propping Property Right Theory Asset-specific Dynamic Model

分类号 F279 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献11

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