摘要
本文分析了利益相关者的会计行为,建立了利益相关者财务披露监管的博弈分析模型,提出了在按会计行为偏好对利益相关者进行分类的基础上实行分工监督的设想,并提出建立由同类利益相关者共同分担监督成本的机制以协调利益相关者集体理性与个体理性之间的矛盾,从而使该设想更具有可行性。
This article analyzes the stakeholders' accounting behaviors and sets up an analyzing model for the system of stakeholders' supervi- sing over financial disclosure on the basis of game theory.It presents a conception that stakeholders could be sorted on their accounting behavior predilections and performs the supervising separately.It also suggests setting up a system in which the stakeholders of the same kind should afford the supervising cost together in order to coordinate the conflict between individual ration and collective ration.This makes the conception more feasible.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期35-41,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"企业利益相关者结构特征与财务披露监管模式研究"(70472013)的阶段性成果。
