摘要
通过追溯中国上市公司控股股东的实际控制人和股权性质,本文将中国的上市公司分为四组:国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司,中央直属国有企业控股的上市公司,地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司和私有产权控股的上市公司。我们发现,不同的国有产权行使主体对上市公司经营绩效的影响有明显的不同,国有企业控股的上市公司要比国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司有更好的绩效表现,中央直属国有企业控股的上市公司要比地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司有更好的绩效表现,私有产权控股的上市公司的绩效表现仅仅与一般水平的国有产权控股的上市公司的绩效表现相当。这说明在一个法律基础薄弱的转型经济体中,上市公司的私有产权控股同样会面临比较严重的代理问题。
By tracing the identity of large shareholders,China's listed companies are grouped into those controlled by SAMBs,SOEs affiliated to the central government(SOECGs),SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs),and private companies.Based on this classification,the study investigates the relative efficiency of state vs.private ownership and that of various state forms of ownership.The empirical results indicate that state institutions as shareholders of Chinese listed companies are associated with different operating efficiency accord- ing to the way the state ownership is exercised.SOEs controlled firms are better than those controlled by SAMBs.SOECGs are better shareholders than SOELGs.Private shareholders are just as good as the middle per- former of state institutions.Therefore,in transitional economies with weak legal environment,private ownership in listed companies subjects to rather serious agency problems.
出处
《世界经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第10期78-89,共12页
The Journal of World Economy
基金
中山大学青年教师桐山基金项目(0509047)
广东省自然科学基金项目(5300541)的资助
