摘要
针对当前中国缺乏高信誉度品牌这一现象,本文构造了一个重复博弈理论模型,试图找出其背后更深层的经济和制度原因。现有文献主要研究均衡所能实现的最高效率支付(最好均衡)。我们认为,分析中国信誉缺失问题,合理的视角应该是考查最差均衡,并据此来分析摆脱低信誉陷阱的因素。在本文的模型里,在均衡中企业信誉有一个动态演变的过程。在一定的条件下,即使在最差均衡中,经过足够长的时间后,均衡会实现从低效率状态到高效率状态的转变,而社会总体效率取决于这种转变的快慢。我们刻画了这种转变所需要的时间,以及影响转变速度的经济制度因素。我们发现,中国社会普遍的低信任度、市场机制的不完善(尤其是市场中介机构和监督机构的不足)、市场竞争的不充分和技术水平的落后,是阻碍和延长中国经济从低效率到高效率状态转变的重要因素。
A widely spread phenomenon in China is that firms seem to lack incentives to build reputation. In this paper we build a repeated game model to analyze the economic and institutional factors behind this phenomenon. The existing literature mainly focuses on the most efficient equilibrium in repeated games. We think that the right approach to study reputation issues in China is to focus on the least, not the most, efficient equilibrium, and analyze factors affect the equilibrium moves from the low efficient to high efficient state. In our model, in equilibrium firm reputation is a dynamic process. Under certain conditions, for a sufficiently long time, even the least efficient equilibrium will move to the high efficient state. The total social welfare depends on how fact such a transition takes place. We characterize the time needed for such a transition, and analyze the factors affecting the transition speed. We find that the relatively low trust level in China, the insufficient market institutions, the insufficient competition, and the relatively low technology level, all contribute to the slow transition from the low efficient state to the high efficient state.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期85-93,102,共10页
Economic Research Journal
关键词
信誉
重复博弈
效率
Reputation
Repeated Game
Efficiency
