摘要
本文以2001年到2003年被出具非标准无保留审计意见的所有A股上市公司为样本,研究了公司股权结构特征对审计师变更行为的影响。研究结果表明(:1)出具“不清洁”审计意见的审计师发生变更行为的概率与第一大股东的持股比例显著正相关;(2)上一年度“不清洁”审计意见的严厉程度越高,审计师发生变更行为的可能性也越大;(3)其它大股东与第一大股东持股比例差距的减少,大股东之间相互制衡能力的增强会显著降低审计师发生变更行为的可能性。这些发现为改“一股独大”为“多股同大”,增加大股东相互制衡能力来改善独立审计执业环境,保证其监督机制作用的改革思路提供了实证证据。
This study empirically examines the relationship between shareholders structure and auditor changes based on Chinese listed companies. As a result, we find that the possibility of auditor changes is positively correlated with the share proportion held by the largest shareholder and the severity level of last year's modified auditing opinion. More importantly, our results show that reducing the controlling gap between controlling shareholders will reduce the likelihood of auditor changes. Our results imply that transforming the ownership structure from sole controlling shareholders to multiple controlling shareholders might be a feasible way to improve auditor independence and protect the interests of individual investors.
出处
《管理评论》
2006年第11期3-7,12,共6页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(70572041)
教育部人文社科项目资助(03JD630024)。
