摘要
前后期维特根斯坦对可能性(即可能情形)给出了两种截然不同的分析。前期给特根斯坦认为,可能性是一种独立于语言表现的、虽然没有实现出来但却(现实地)存在的事态。因而,可能性可以说是一种“影子式的实在(现实)”。后期维特根斯坦则认为,可能性并非是一种独立于语方表现的存在物,“某某事项是可能的”这种说法只是意味着“关于某某事项的语言表现合乎相关的语法规则”而已。
Ludwig Wittgenstein gives two completely different interpretations of 'possibility' in his early life and in his later life. Wittgenstein in his early life holds that possibility is a state in (actual) existence which has not been achieved and is separate from linguistic expression while actuality is a state in (actual) existence which has been achieved and is separate from linguistic expression. Thus, possibility can be regarded as 'shadow-like actuality'. In his later life, Wittgenstein holds that possibility is not a being independent of linguistic expression and 'something is possible' only means that 'the linguistic expression of something suits the corresponding grammatical rules'.
出处
《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第6期28-37,共10页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition
